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‘Pretty much the whole of education’1: virtue and performance in the Laws 
Marcus Folch, The City and the stage: Performance, Genre and Gender in Plato’s Laws. 
Oxford, Oxford University Press. 2015. pp. 12 +386. ISBN 978-0-19-026617-2. 
Susan Sauvé Meyer, Plato: Laws 1 &2, translated with an introduction and commentary. 
Clarendon Plato series, Oxford, Oxford University Press. 2015. pp. xiv+361. ISBN 978-0-19-
960408-1. 
The first two books of the Laws are certainly among the most important in the dialogue. 
They reveal the aims of the dialogue as a discussion of laws and set up a conversational 
framework in which Athenian traditions, represented by the main speaker, are brought into 
a constructive confrontation with the Dorian ideas and customs of his Cretan and Spartan 
companions. At the same time they serve to establish the psychological and ethical 
presuppositions which underpin the more politically oriented discussions elsewhere in the 
dialogue. But these books are also puzzling. One reason for this is that a lot of space is 
devoted to the discussion of drinking parties. Another is that the key ideas evolve gradually 
in a conversational way. Unlike the leading speakers in other Platonic dialogues the 
Athenian does not subject his companions to searching examination. In consequence it is 
sometimes unclear precisely which claims are being rejected and which asserted. 
For these reasons Susan Sauvé Meyer’s volume is particularly welcome. Its general format 
resembles that of other contributions to the Clarendon Plato series. A brief introduction is 
followed by an outline analysis of the two books, a translation, 262 pages of very detailed 
commentary, and a substantial bibliography. The translation is intended to be ‘optimal for 
the Greekless philosophical reader’. So far as I can judge it achieves this objective admirably. 
It lacks the panache of Saunders’ version but has greater precision. To my mind it also more 
readable and reliable than Pangle’s.2 An added advantage is that the commentary discusses 
difficulties of translation in considerable detail. So in most cases where a competent scholar 
might disagree with Meyer’s version the alternatives are identified and discussed. 
The commentary avowedly ‘reflects presuppositions characteristic of scholarship on Plato in 
the English-speaking world over the last half century’. One might wonder whether Laws I 
and II form a suitable text for this kind of treatment. But in fact Meyer is very successful in 
teasing out the structure of the arguments, identifying alternative interpretations and 
showing the underlying coherence of the dialogue. In particular she shows how, on some 
key issues, the Athenian seems to begin from positions suggested by the Cretan and Spartan 
but moves gradually to something rather different without clearly marking the shifts in his 
position or explicitly rejecting the views of his companions. Meyer’s outline analysis is 
particularly helpful in displaying the general shape and direction of the argument. 
Meyer’s analytic approach means that she does not give much prominence to some issues 
which have bulked large in recent scholarship. She says little about questions of literary 
                                                          
1 Laws 672e, translation adapted from Meyer. 
2 It may now have a rival in the new translation by Tom Griffith, in Malcolm Schofield (ed.), The Laws of Plato, 
Cambridge Texts in the History of Political Thought, Cambridge CUP, 2016. 
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form, about the characterisation of the interlocutors or about the social, cultural and 
historical background to the dialogue. But she is careful to distinguish passages where she 
believes the Athenian responds to the Cretan and the Spartan by adopting their 
assumptions from ones where he is speaking with his own voice. 
In The City and the Stage Marcus Folch also discusses large parts of Laws I and II in 
considerable detail, but the scope of his book and the methods of interpretation he employs 
are very different from those of Meyer. He focuses on the arts of poetry, music and dance in 
the Laws as a whole, and his treatment of these topics is heavily influenced by speech-act 
and performance theory. The underlying thought here is that the arts which Plato classes as 
mousikē—music, dance and theatre—are intimately bound up with the institutions and 
practices of society as a whole. They play a key role in determining and expressing political 
and gender roles within a society and in constructing the identities of its members. Thus 
Folch’s book is not simply a discussion of the performing arts, in the narrow traditional 
sense, but impinges on many other aspects of Plato’s thought as it is displayed in the Laws. 
In particular Folch sees his treatment of the dialogue as differing from its predecessors in 
four respects (6-9): 
1. It sees the philosophical dialogue as ‘a literary genre with distinctively literary 
ambitions’ while also treating it as a commentary on fourth century political practice. 
2. It shows that Plato’s account of mousikē embodies ‘a deep substrate of 
philosophical argument—a normative conception of the city, citizen, soul and of 
their place within a larger metaphysical reality.’ 
3. It is explicitly concerned with ‘the status—political social and performative—of 
figures and voices which have often been marginalised in in the study of ancient 
philosophy and aesthetics: slaves, non-citizens and women’. 
4. It argues that the concerns of contemporary performance theorists—‘the efficacy 
of performed speech, the socially constructive force of ritual, the performative 
properties of gender and status—are central to ancient philosophy’. 
The fourth point is, is I think most fundamental and distinctive. Folch is not the only scholar 
who has sought to apply performance theory to the Laws,3 but he does this in notably 
systematic way. Following the anthropologist, Clifford Geertz, he raises the question 
whether there is a ‘middle term which can enable us to understand the interrelation of 
politics and culture’ (49). Plato, he suggests, finds the middle term in the soul. Thus the 
psychology of the Laws is essential to understanding its account of performance culture. 
Folch is surely right to emphasise the importance of psychology in the Laws and its 
connection with music and dance. Although books I and II are largely occupied with 
discussion of drinking parties and musical education, their most important role is to 
establish a certain view of moral psychology. This view is, of course, essential to 
                                                          
3 For example, similar concerns are shared by many of the contributors to Pepone, A.-E., Performance and 
Culture in Plato’s Laws, Oxford , 2013 and by L Prauscello, Performing Citizenship in Plato’s Laws, Cambridge, 
2014 
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understanding why Plato pays so much attention to the performing arts, but it also 
underpins the entire legislative programme, a programme that is designed to inculcate 
complete virtue in the souls of the citizens. Folch deals at length with these points in his 
opening chapters. 
In his opening pages Folch points to what he claims is a marked contrast between the Laws 
and Plato’s earlier writings. As he sees it, Plato, throughout much of his career, was highly 
critical of Athenian performance culture and exposed ‘the fallacies, inconsistencies, and 
dubious ethical claims’ implicit in the ancient poetical tradition. Moreover in the Republic he 
proposes the abolition of all forms of mimetic art. Although he concentrates his fire on 
poetry, his strictures clearly apply to other performing arts such as music and dance. In the 
Laws, on the other hand, these arts receive much more favourable attention. Poetic 
discourse is readmitted though subordinated to ‘philosophical standards of excellence and 
mimetic correctness’. Poetry and ‘music’ (understood in a broad sense) play a key role in the 
life of the city. ‘Every dimension of the citizen’s life receives musical inflection, and many of 
the genres purged from the earlier dialogue become central to a life of virtue.’ This is 
evident, not only in Books I and II but also in other parts of the dialogue, notably in Book VII, 
which describes the educational arrangements of the proposed Cretan city. Folch takes this 
to imply that Plato has made a ‘striking about face’. As he sees it, the Laws represents a 
systematic rethinking of the nature of aesthetics and mimetic art, of the part played by 
poetry music, song and dance in the making of citizens and of how the individual and 
collective life of the polis is constituted in performance. It presents ‘a renegotiation of the 
relationship between poetry and philosophy.’ Both are now seen as collaborators in 
fashioning the ideal city and the virtuous life. 
There is no doubt that the treatments of the performing arts in the Republic and the Laws 
differ from one another in important ways. But it is questionable whether the differences 
are quite as radical as Folch suggests. Republic Books II and III make it clear that a correct 
training in poetry and music is essential to virtue. Indeed it is the primary means of ensuring 
that the guardians do not go wild and attack the fellow citizens they are supposed to 
protect. The tone is very different from that in the Laws because the Republic concentrates 
on showing the corrupting effects of existing poetic and musical practices. But there is no 
doubt that correct training in these arts is central to the education of the young. So far as 
mimesis is concerned, most attention is paid to the dangers of imitating inappropriate 
characters, but the young will clearly be expected to learn poetry that imitates the 
characters of good men. Thus there are important continuities in the treatment of mousikē 
between the Republic and the Laws. Many of these are identified by Meyer in her 
commentary. One might therefore argue that, if there is an ‘about face’, it comes within the 
Republic. Socrates’ claim, at the beginning of Book X, that he and his companions have 
agreed to ban all forms of mimetic poetry from the ideal city seems inconsistent with what 
was actually said in Book III. Much ink has been spent over this point, but the rejection of 
mimesis in Republic X is manifestly related to the idea, developed in Books VI and VII, that 
only the philosopher’s access to the Forms provides genuine truth. It is not clear how it 
would apply in a city, like that of the Laws which lacks philosopher rulers. 
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On Folch’s account the Republic and the Laws also differ sharply in their psychological views 
and the consequent accounts of virtue. He rightly points out that the Laws account involves 
the training of the passions so as to produce a concord (sumphonia) between the rational 
and irrational parts of the soul. This, he claims, contrasts with the Republic where the lower 
parts of the soul ‘contribute nothing to the process of moral deliberation and action’ and 
the virtuous man is virtuous ‘because his reason dominates, restrains and redirects the 
lower parts of his soul’ (81). Thus the virtuous man of the Republic would not even count as 
educated by the standards of the Laws because ‘his passions have not been habituated to 
respond appropriately to the right kinds of object’ (83-4). 
There are plenty of passages in the Republic which may seem to confirm this view but, as 
Meyer points out, there are also ones which suggest that, when reason rules, the parts of 
the soul are in a state of concord (sumphonia) and harmony with one another (430e, 442c, 
cf. Meyer 210). The harmony to be found in the soul is likened to the harmony between 
musical notes. It is made clear that this inner concord can be achieved only if children are 
brought up in a beautiful environment and receive the right kind of musical and poetic 
education (401c-d). At 586e Socrates argues that, where reason rules, each part gains its 
truest pleasure, the ones that are most its own. So, although the Republic emphasises the 
struggle between reason and the passions and generally treats pleasure as something to be 
resisted, there are important passages which suggest something more like the harmony 
view of the Laws. 
In fact there seems to be a similar duality in the early books of the Laws. Folch says little 
about the opening pages which start from the idea that courage is the key virtue because it 
ensures victory and move to the idea that the greatest victory is the victory over self. Meyer 
calls this the ‘victory’ model and contrasts it with the ‘harmony’ model which appears later 
in Book I and comes to dominate the discussion in Book II. She associates the victory model 
with the Cretan and the Spartan and argues that, when the Athenian appears to endorse it, 
he is simply responding to his interlocutors in their own terms. 
A key passage in this context is Book I, 643-5. The Athenian here introduces the idea that 
genuine education leads children to find pleasure in a life of virtue, but he immediately 
reminds his companions of their agreement that virtue is a matter of self-rule. He goes on to 
elucidate this with an account of the soul. He argues first that the soul contains two ‘witless’ 
counsellors, pleasure and pain, together with opinions about the future. These are identified 
with the feelings of fear and daring or confidence. Besides these there is logismos, 
calculation, which ‘when it becomes the common view of the city is called ‘law’. When his 
companions express puzzlement about this the Athenian elucidates his view with an image 
of the soul as a puppet or marionette. The inner experiences which he has just mentioned 
are likened to ‘cords’ which pull against each other. Our task is to cling to the ‘golden’ cord 
of calculation or law rather than giving way to the iron cords of the other affections. Having 
given this account the Athenian goes straight on to discuss the benefits of drinking parties. 
Meyer argues that the Athenian is here working with the ‘victory’ model put forward by his 
Cretan and Spartan companions but may not be subscribing to it himself. The passage thus 
implies an account of virtue as consisting in the capacity to cling to calculation and resist the 
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temptations of pleasure and pain. However she finds ambiguities in the subsequent 
discussion of drinking parties which suggest a shift to the ‘harmony’ model. It is certainly 
true that the Athenian seems to prefer the harmony model and to see it as constituting 
genuine virtue. It underlies the account of musical education and much else (including, it 
would seem, the idea that laws should have preambles). But one could argue that the 
victory model continues to play a role. It is not explicitly abandoned and may represent the 
only kind of virtue which some can achieve. It might help to make sense of, for example, the 
idea that punishment can improve the souls of malefactors. 
Folch offers a very different account of this passage. In his view the first few lines with their 
reference to the witless counsellors invoke an Athenian political model which contrasts with 
the Dorian presuppositions of his companions. This model is, he claims, hierarchical in the 
sense that the irrational principles are subordinated to calculation. In this respect it 
resembles the Republic’s account though there is no reference to a spirited part and no 
suggestion that pleasure and pain must necessarily conflict with calculation. However, in 
Folch’s view, the introduction of the puppet image implies a different account in which the 
soul is seen as a ‘horizontal structure’ in which logismos is one among many competing 
impulses. This, Folch argues, provides the philosophical and psychological framework for 
understanding the role of sympotic and musical education as a preparation for citizenship 
(77). I am not convinced by this. As Meyer points out, the puppet passage is introduced as 
an elucidation of the account of the soul suggested in the previous lines, not as an 
alternative to it. Moreover the suggestion that it offers a ‘horizontal’ model of the soul is 
particularly puzzling. It may well leave room for pleasure and pain to play a more positive 
role in the virtuous life, but they can do so only in so far as they follow the guidance of 
calculation. That suggests that they operate on a different level. 
A central issue in the Laws is the relationship between pleasure and the good. The Athenian 
evidently wants to insist that the virtuous life can be commended in terms of pleasure, but 
he draws back from identifying pleasure and the good. He raises this point in Laws II, 652a 
ff., where he argues that educating the young consists in training them to have correct 
feelings of pleasure and pain. Education, in this sense, is distinguished from complete virtue 
which consists in having ‘a rational account’ and feelings of pleasure and pain which agree 
with it. Music and dance are important because they are the means by which the young are 
trained to feel pleasure and pain in the right way and because they help older people to 
maintain their education. On Meyer’s analysis this is followed by a complex piece of dialectic 
which demonstrates that ‘virtue, not pleasure, is the standard of beautiful choral art’. The 
close connection between pleasure and virtue is initially taken to suggest that pleasure may 
be the criterion by which music and dance should be judged, but the fact that different age 
groups take pleasure in different kinds of performance shows that this needs qualification. 
The Athenian agrees that music is to be judged by pleasure but not that of any random 
person. Rather it should be judged by the pleasure of the best educated (658e). 
Commenting on this, Meyer suggests that the Athenian does not endorse pleasure as the 
criterion by which the best people evaluate music, but rather notes the extensional 
equivalence between the finest music and that which pleases the best educated. This could 
be taken to mean that there is no necessary connection between pleasure and excellence in 
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performance. Later the best educated are identified with the chorus of Dionysus, the older 
men, who sing under the influence of alcohol. They are qualified to judge music in so far as 
they can assess the accuracy with which it represents admirable (kalon) behaviour. Meyer 
sees this as a ‘categorical rejection’ of the pleasure criterion. There is thus a kind of 
development within Book II from the popular idea that the criterion of artistic excellence is 
pleasure, through the idea that what counts is the pleasure of the best educated, to the idea 
that it consists in the accurate representation of virtue. 
As one would expect Folch’s treatment of Book II is less concerned with the analysis of 
argument and more with the role of performance. Thus he assimilates the role of the chorus 
of Dionysus to that of the critic in modern performance cultures, and gives more stress than 
Meyer to the role of pleasure in artistic judgment. For example, he finds in 655d-e, a 
suggestion that ‘declarations of artistic judgment, which are no more or less than 
expressions of pleasure and pain, are in fact declarations of moral judgment. We pronounce 
beautiful and we experience aesthetic pleasure in representations of characters and 
dispositions that accord with our own character and ethical disposition’ (93). On the surface, 
at least, the suggestion that moral judgments are expressions of pleasure would contradict 
most of what Plato says elsewhere about pleasure and is at odds with Meyer’s view that in 
Laws II categorically rejects  the idea that pleasure is the criterion of artistic judgment. But 
the difference may not be quite as great as it sounds. Folch himself comments later that 
pleasure is a ‘secondary feature in mousikē (141). Taking a cue from Meyer, one might take 
this to mean that experiencing the correct pleasure is not a sufficient condition for wisdom 
or genuine virtue but it is a necessary one. The point might be that, human nature being 
what it is, we can reliably form correct moral judgments and sustain them through our lives 
only if we learn to take pleasure in the right things. On that view pleasure would not be the 
criterion of artistic judgment, but only those whose pleasures are correctly ordered can 
make these judgments correctly. Similarly the pleasures experienced by the best educated 
may not be the true criterion of artistic excellence but they may be a reliable guide. 
I have concentrated on Books I and II partly because that makes it possible compare the 
approaches of Meyer and Folch and partly because the account of human psychology and its 
relationship to musical performance which we find in those books provides the 
psychological and philosophical foundation for Folch’s work. But he also has much to say 
about issues which are not directly considered in the first two books. This is particularly true 
of the second and third parts of his book which deal with Genre and Gender. A key passage 
for Folch’s treatment of Genre is the account in Laws III of the way in which the decline in 
musical standards in Athens led to the corruption of Athenian democracy. One element in 
this is that poets began to aim at pleasing the masses who, as a consequence, came to see 
themselves as competent judges, not only of music but also of other matters. Another 
element is that poets began to ignore the laws which distinguished different kinds of 
music—hymns, laments, paeans, dithyrambs and ‘nomes’. This lawlessness passed from 
music to the general life of the city. Folch discusses this, together with remarks elsewhere in 
the Laws about the types of music which should or should not be permitted, in the light of 
recent scholarship on the literature, music and politics of Plato’s day. There is little room for 
doubt that Plato took seriously the idea that the corruption of musical genres could lead to 
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dangerous extremes of democracy and believed that they should be subject to strict 
supervision. But, as Folch recognises, it is more difficult to understand what genres precisely 
he would permit and why. The Athenian approves of hymns and encomia but neither seems 
really to constitute a unique genre. 
Folch’s treatment of Gender begins with an excellent discussion of the roles assigned to 
women in the Laws. The main difficulty here, as most scholars would recognise, is that, 
while some of the Athenian’s remarks suggest in a general way that women will have a 
much more active role than was normal in Greek cities, he pays very little attention to this 
when he describes institutions in detail. Sometimes he seems to assume that all who take 
part in public life will be male. Very much the same seems to be true of music. For example, 
it is clear that girls should have some share in musical education, but the chorus of 
Dionysus, which determines musical standards is described in terms which suggest that it is 
an exclusively masculine institution. The one place where there is a detailed account of 
women’s role in musical performance comes close to the end of the dialogue where there is 
an elaborate description of the funeral ceremonies for those who have held the office of 
auditor. Thus, to my mind, the evidence that performance plays an important positive role 
in the making of citizen women is somewhat limited. 
Although they are very different, both Meyer’s and Folch’s books can be recommended with 
some enthusiasm. Meyer’s will be indispensable to anyone who wants seriously to engage 
with the arguments of the Laws. Folch’s is impressive because it demonstrates convincingly 
the central role Plato would give to musical performance. In particular he shows how it 
provides the psychological underpinnings for the institutions and practices described in the 
dialogue. In this way it does much to elucidate what Plato has in mind when he has the 
Athenian insist that every institution in the city must serve to promote complete virtue 
among the citizens. 
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